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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioner, Mr. Jackson, filed this petition for review of
the Industrial Commission's November 3, 1992, Order affirming the
Administrative
Conclusions

Law Judge's

July 28, 1992, Findings

of Law, and Order, both of which

of Fact,

orders denied

Mr. Jackson's application for permanent total disability benefits.
Respondents Kaiser Steel Corporation
Employer's

Fund

("UEF"),1

("Kaiser") and Uninsured

(collectively referred to herein as

"Respondents") agree with the statutory bases for jurisdiction
cited in Mr. Jackson's brief.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The Respondents agree with Mr. Jackson's statement that this
appeal presents only one issue, namely whether his 1972 industrial
accident caused him to be permanently totally disabled.

He asks,

in essence, that the Court of Appeals re-weigh the evidence already
considered

by

the Administrative

Law

Judge

("ALJ") and

the

Industrial Commission ("Commission").
Contrary to Mr. Jackson's contention (Brief, p. 1), medical
causation is a factual question.
P.2d 447, 450 (Utah App. 1991).

Merriam v. Board of Review, 812
Accordingly, the standard of

appellate review to be applied is whether the Commission's findings
are "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the

The Uninsured Employers' Fund appears in the interest of
the bankrupt Kaiser Steel Corporation pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-107.

whole record before the court."

Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g);

King v. Industrial Commission, 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 34 (Utah App.
March 18, 1993).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
With

the

possible

addition

of

the

Utah

Administrative

Procedures Act provision cited above, Respondents agree with Mr.
Jackson that Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67 is the determinative statute
in this case.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal of a denial of Mr. Jackson's October 25,
1991 application for permanent total disability compensation based
on an industrial injury which occurred on April 10, 1972.

Course of Proceedings
On March 2, 1973, eleven months after Mr. Jackson's accident,
he

filed an application

for hearing alleging

entitlement to

permanent partial disability compensation (Record, p. 5 ) . Based
upon the report of the Disability Rating Board, the Commission
found Mr. Jackson entitled to 31.2 weeks of permanent partial
disability compensation, representing a 10% impairment (Record,
p. 9 ) .

That amount was paid by Kaiser and the case was closed

(Record, p. 10).
-2-

Over eighteen years later, on October 25, 1991, Mr. Jackson
filed an application for permanent total disability benefits as a
result of his 1972 accident (Record, p. 14). Kaiser and the UEF
answered

the application

for hearing

Employers' Reinsurance Fund
pp. 20-22).

and moved

to join the

("ERF") as a respondent

(Record,

A formal hearing was held on June 23, 1992.

Agency Disposition
On July 28, 1992, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") entered
detailed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order concluding
that Mr. Jackson failed to sustain his burden of establishing that
his industrial accident was the medical or legal cause of his
disability. The ALJ therefore denied the claim for permanent total
disability benefits (Record, pp. 39-43, copy attached as Exhibit
"B" to Mr. Jackson's brief).
Mr. Jackson filed a Motion for Review with the Commission
assigning

three

Commission

points

entered

of error

its Order

(Record,

Denying

pp. 45-46).

Motion

The

for Review on

November 3, 1992 separately addressing each of Mr. Jackson's points
(Record, pp. 88-92, copy attached as Exhibit "C" to Mr. Jackson's
brief).

The Commission's action is the subject of Mr. Jackson's

Petition for Review.

-3-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Jackson twisted his back in an industrial accident which
occurred on or about April 10, 1972 (Record, p. 2). 2 There was no
fracture or dislocation

(Record, p. 1), and there has been no

surgery or ongoing treatment of the back.

After a period of

temporary disability, he returned to work at Kaiser for a total of
about 4£ months (Record, p. 40).
Mr. Jackson then applied for and received from Kaiser payments
of temporary total and permanent partial disability compensation
based on a finding by the Disability Rating Board that the accident
resulted

in a "10% loss of bodily

function

as a result of

aggravation of a previously existing degenerate arthrosis of the
spine" (Record, p. 8). The pre-existing condition was not rated by
the Panel, though the Panel's rating appears to have been an
apportionment of Dr. Milligan's finding of a 20% impairment of the
back, including the preexisting degenerative arthritis (Record,
pp. 186,

222).

Payment

was

acknowledged

by

Mr. Jackson

on

April 25, 1973 in a document that also indicated the Applicant's
intent to release Kaiser from any additional liability (Record,
p. 10).

Curiously, Mr. Jackson devotes an entire argument to his
complaint that the Commission "failed to find that Petitioner
experienced a compensable industrial accident" (Brief, p. 11). In
fact, both the ALJ and the Commission acknowledged that a
compensable accident had occurred (Record, pp. 39, 89). They also
found, however, that the accident did not cause any disability
beyond that already rated and paid.
-4-

About one week after receiving his award of permanent partial
disability

benefits, the Applicant

filed

for social security

disability benefits alleging disability due to "Lung problems breathing difficulty, ulcer, back trouble, arthritis of spine"
(Record, p. 223).3 Social Security benefits were awarded. He also
applied for and received his miner's pension at age 55 and federal
black

lung benefits, an award that is given only

for total

pulmonary disability (Record, p. 41). See 30 U.S.C. § 901.
Omitted from Mr. Jackson's statement of facts are the numerous
contradictions between the Applicant's recollection and the medical
records, and between his statements to Dr. Hess (Record, pp. 180187) and his testimony at hearing. These contradictions were noted
and discussed by the Administrative Law Judge (Record, pp. 40-43)
and by the Commission (Record, pp. 90-91).
Among

the

contradictions

are

Mr. Jackson's

denials

of

breathing problems (Record, p. 41) contrasted with the black lung
claim and medical reports of moderate to moderately severe chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease in 1974 (Record, p. 204), complaints
of progressive dyspnea (shortness of breath) beginning in 1973
(Record, p. 211), and a May 14, 1973 report to Social Security that

At the time, Mr. Jackson clearly indicated that his
industrial back strain was not the basis for his Social Security
total disability claim. Mr. Jackson referenced no accident and, on
page 2 of his May 4, 1973 Application for Total Disability
Insurance Benefits, he answered paragraph 7(a) by affirming under
penalty of law that he had never filed, and never intended to file,
a claim for workmen's compensation benefits (Record, p. 224).
-5-

he was "having much trouble breathing" (Record, p. 227). While he
testified at hearing that he was unable to return to work because
of back pain (Record, p. 110), he denied any previous history of
traumatic injury to his back in 1991 (Record, p. 193).

Several

doctors described back pain and other problems associated with
degenerative arthritis, but none of them attributed the symptoms to
industrial injury (Record, pp. 193, 203, 211, 222, 227). The more
recent examination reports offered by Mr. Jackson describe no
limitation of motion in the back in 1980 (Records, p. 212), and
improved range of motion since he was rated by the Disability
Rating Board (Record, p. 186).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Commission properly found that Mr. Jackson failed to carry
his affirmative burden of proof of establishing by a preponderance
of the evidence that his industrial injury was the medical cause of
his disability.

Contrary to his argument, the "liberal policy"

behind the Worker's Compensation laws is not a substitute for this
burden of proof.
There

is no affirmative medical

evidence that

the

accident rendered the applicant permanent totally disabled.

1972
He

never underwent surgery for his back and obtained no impairment
rating greater than that already paid by Kaiser.

The record

contains no medical evidence indicating any progression of his back
symptoms since the Commission's earlier award.
-6-

The ALJ carefully and comprehensively analyzed this largely
uncontradicted

evidence.

Her

denial

of

benefits,

and

the

Commission's order affirming that denial, are amply supported by
substantial evidence and should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT
THE COMMISSION'S ORDER IS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
The ALJ entered her Order denying benefits after reviewing
Mr. Jackson's testimony and all of the medical evidence (Record,
pp. 39-43).

Based on that review, she found that proof of medical

and legal causation was lacking.

Mr. Jackson then filed a Motion

for Review with the Commission.

The Commission carefully and

comprehensively reviewed the evidence.

It found adequate support

for the ALJ's finding that the recent medical report submitted by
Mr. Jackson documented that his back impairment is lower now than
in 19734 and, noting no conflict in the evidence relating to
medical causation, found that Mr. Jackson had failed to satisfy his
burden of proof (Record, p. 88-92).
Mr. Jackson

then

took

this

appeal,

acknowledging

that

causation is the only substantial issue presented by this appeal
Mr. Jackson complains about the Commission's "clear
misreading" of Dr. Hess's report (Brief, p. 10). It is difficult
to understand this argument. Dr. Hess's report, which was offered
by Mr. Jackson, clearly states that the amount of impairment
attributable to the industrial accident had decreased from 10% (20%
overall) to 6% (12% overall), and that he has a better range of
motion now than when previously rated (Record, p. 186).
-7-

(Brief, p. 1). He incorrectly argues, however, that the standard
of review for such a reweighing of evidence is the "correction of
error" standard.

In fact, the appropriate standard is whether the

findings are supported by substantial evidence.

Merriam v. Board

of Review, 812 P.2d at 450.
To excuse his lack of proof, Mr. Jackson argues that the
"liberal construction" properly accorded the workers' compensation
laws supplants his burden of establishing entitlement to benefits
by a preponderance of the evidence and effectively establishes a
general presumption of entitlement to benefits (Brief, pp. 5-8).
His only other argument of substance is that the Commission erred
in failing to apply the "odd lot" doctrine to this case (Brief, pp.
13-17).

A.

Neither argument succeeds for the reasons that follow.

Mr. Jackson has been Fully Compensated for his Back Injury.
There is no dispute that the rating given for the Applicant's

back injury was accepted by Kaiser and fully paid.

All temporary

total compensation, permanent partial compensation, and medical
expenses attributable to that injury were paid by Kaiser and
acknowledged by the Applicant.
received

total

disability

The Applicant then sought and

benefits

from

Administration and the Department of Labor.

the

Social

Security

In both instances he

received awards for a total disability that was not predicated on

-8-

his 1972 back injury (for which partial impairment he had already
been compensated).5
In describing the purpose of the workers' compensation law,
the Utah Supreme Court has noted that temporary total disability
and permanent partial disability:
. . . are two parts of an integrated effort to
compensate employees for wage losses suffered
by reason of industrial injuries. As such,
they should be viewed and applied as a whole,
not in isolation. So viewed and applied, they
should not require an employer to compensate
an employee for wage losses for which the
employer has already compensated him or her.
Similarly, we have held in Paoli v. Cottonwood
Hospital, Utah 656 P.2d 420, 421 (1982) and
David v. Industrial Commission, Utah 649 P.2d
82 (1982), that the closely related second
injury fund was not intended to compensate an
employee again for permanent impairment for
which he or she has already been compensated.
Hudson v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 662 P.2d 29, 30-31 (Utah 1983).
In the present case, the Applicant has already been fully
compensated by Kaiser for the only impairment attributed to the
1972 industrial industry. The Applicant is receiving compensation
from the Social Security Administration and the Department of Labor
for the wage loss occasioned by other total disabilities, and the
Mr. Jackson correctly notes that the Social Security
award was premised upon his general back condition, as well as his
pulmonary complaints (Brief, p. 8). Contrary to his statement that
the back condition was related to his industrial accident, his
application indicates that pulmonary complaints were his primary
problem and it affirmatively disclaims an industrial disability.
See n. 3, supra.
The contemporaneous and subsequent medical
reports are consistent with Mr. Jackson's original Social Security
filings and inconsistent with his new attempt to implicate the
industrial accident.
-9»

Utah Workers' Compensation law is not intended to provide him a
double recovery.

This case is quite similar in this respect to

Hodges v. Western Piling & Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986).
In that case, a worker sustained a nine percent impairment due to
industrial causes against a backdrop of a one hundred percent
impairment due to a previously asymptomatic arthritic condition.
In light of the fact that the applicant had a total disability due
to other causes, the Supreme Court found substantial evidence to
support the Commission's denial of permanent total disability
benefits arising out of the industrial accident.
In the present case, the purposes of workers' compensation are
amply

satisfied

by

the

compensation

received

for

other

disabilities, and the ALJ appropriately denied Mr. Jackson's
application for additional compensation.

B.

The Commission Applied the Correct Burden of Proof.
The ALJ found that Mr. Jackson failed to sustain his burden of

establishing medical causation (Record, pp. 42-43).

In denying

Mr. Jackson's Motion for Review, the Commission found that ALJ had
properly required proof of causation by preponderance of the
evidence (Record, p. 89).

The findings of both the ALJ and the

Commission are appropriate and should be affirmed.
The Utah courts have consistently required proof of a causal
connection between the injury and the employment.
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 22 (Utah 1986).
-10-

Allen v.

In Allen, the

Supreme Court adopted a two-part test for causation.

In order to

identify compensable injuries, consideration must first be given to
the legal cause of the injury and then to its medical cause, which
is to prove that "the disability is medically the result of an
exertion or injury that occurred during a work-related activity."
Id. at 27.

Proof of medical causation is required, according to

the Court, to prevent the employer from becoming "a general insurer
of his employees." Thus, it remains the claimant's burden to show
that "the stress, strain, or exertion required by his or her
occupation led to the resulting injury or disability. In the event
the claimant cannot show a medical causal connection, compensation
should be denied."

Id.

at 27.

The Allen holding was followed by this Court in the case of
Large v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App.
1988).

In Large, a truck driver suffered a lower back injury while

applying for a job.

Much like the present case, he received an

initial award of temporary total disability benefits which was not
appealed.

Some time later, he filed an application alleging

entitlement to permanent total disability benefits because 5% of
his impairment was due to the 1985 accident. This Court rehearsed
the legal/medical causes tests under Allen and noted that the
standard of proof for causation is that of a preponderance of the
evidence.
prior

back

Id. at 956.
problems,

In light of the applicant's history of
including

surgeries,

the

court

found

substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding that the
-11-

1985 injury with its 5% additional impairment was not the medical
cause of permanent total disability.

Id. at 957. These standards

were expressly followed by both the ALJ and the Commission in the
present case.
Mr. Jackson makes two arguments to suggest that the Commission
should have applied a different burden of proof.
that

the

"liberal

construction"

required

He first argues

of

the

Worker's

Compensation Act is somehow a substitute for his burden of proof.
Then, he argues that the burden of proof is not his, but rather
that it rests with the employer to find a line of employment that
the employee can do.

Both arguments fail.

Mr. Jackson argues that all doubts, no matter how remote or
inconsequential,
compensation

and

must
that

be
it

resolved
is

error

in
if

favor
the

of

an

judge's

award

of

"liberal

construction" is not obvious from the face of the order (Brief,
pp. 5-7).

While the well-recognized beneficial policies of the

Worker's Compensation Act are acknowledged by the Respondents, the
argument that even the slightest factual uncertainty requires an
award of benefits greatly distorts the policy of the law.

His

argument, if adopted, would effectively result in a presumption of
entitlement to benefits in all cases. Employers would always have
the burden of rebutting the presumption.

Such a presumption has

never been a part of Utah Workers' Compensation law.
As noted above, the Utah courts have held that the burden
remains with the applicant to establish his entitlement to benefits
-12-

by a preponderance of the evidence.

Benefits are to be awarded

based upon evidence, not speculation.

In Kaiser Steel Corp. v.

Industrial Commission/ 709 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1985)/ a case cited by
Mr. Jackson/ Chief Justice Hall observed:
"The acknowledged purpose of the Worker's
Compensation Act is to compensate for the
incapacities
attributable
to
industrial
injuries. However, it is not the purpose of
the Act to provide a general health insurance
plan covering and providing for compensation
for any and all preexisting incapacities an
employee may suffer from, and this Court has
never so indicated."
709 P.2d at 1172 (Hall, J., dissenting, emphasis by the Court,
citation omitted).
Mr. Jackson's theory that this policy requires an award of
benefits

regardless

of

how

the

evidence

preponderates

would

effectively remove the element of proof and make of the Worker's
Compensation program a general health insurance plan.

Even the

most "liberal" construction of the law cannot require this result.
Rather, those cases cited by Mr. Jackson must be read to apply to
substantial doubts raised by equally probative but contradictory
evidence. Even in such cases/ care must be taken not to ignore the
requirements that the evidence preponderate in the applicant's
favor before an award of benefits is made.
Caution

must

also

be

exercised

in

applying

a

"liberal

construction" to make sure that the rights of all parties are
safeguarded, not just those of the injured worker.

The United

States Supreme Court, in a case involving the Longshoremen's and
-13-

Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (the "LHWCA"), has discussed the
balance struck in Workers' Compensation legislation:
Implicit in [respondents'] argument, however,
is the assumption that the sole purpose of the
Act was to provide disabled workers with a
complete remedy for their industrial injuries.
The inaccuracy of this implicit assumption
undercuts
the validity
of respondents'
argument.
The
LHWCA,
like
other
workmen's
compensation legislation, is indeed remedial
in that it was intended to provide a certain
recovery for employees who are injured on the
job. It imposes liability without fault and
precludes the assertion of various common-law
defenses that had frequently resulted in the
denial of any recovery for disabled laborers.
While providing employees with the benefit of
a more certain recovery for work-related
harms, statutes of this kind to not purport to
provide complete compensation for the wage
earner's economic loss.
. . . [L]ike most
workmen's compensation legislation, the LHWCA
represents a compromise between the competing
interests of disabled laborers and their
employers.
Potomac Electric Power Company v. Director, OWCP, 449 U.S. 268,
282-283 (1980).

The Utah Workers' Compensation Act also reflects

such a compromise.
Nevertheless, the Administrative
evidence in the light most
p. 42).

Law Judge did view the

favorable to Mr. Jackson

(Record,

She expressly analyzed the evidence on that basis and

still found the required proof of causation lacking.
Similarly, the applicant's reliance on Marshall v. Industrial
Commission, 681 P.2d 208 (1984), is misplaced.

In Marshall, the

Supreme Court formally adopted the "odd lot" doctrine, under which
-14-

the burden shifts to the employer to show that regular work is
available, but only after the employee has demonstrated that his
work-related impairment prevents him from performing his former
work and that he cannot be rehabilitated.

Id. at 212-213; Ortiz v.

Industrial Commission/ 766 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Utah App. 1989).
The

"odd

lot"

doctrine

establishes

no

"presumption

of

permanent and total disability," contrary to Mr. Jackson's argument
(Brief, p. 14). Nor does Marshall excuse an applicant's failure to
prove that his disability is work-related. Implicit in the Court's
adoption of the "odd lot" doctrine is the requirement that an
application for hearing will be filed and documented in a timely
fashion so that the questions of rehabilitation and available work
can be addressed while the evidence is fresh and the applicant is
motivated and of employment age.

Otherwise, the sensible burden-

shifting mechanism of the "odd lot" doctrine becomes so speculative
and hypothetical that it makes no sense.
In the present case, as demonstrated herein, Mr. Jackson did
not demonstrate that his disability was caused by his industrial
accident. Moreover, his 18-year delay in claiming permanent total
disability

benefits

would

work

to

the

extreme

prejudice

Respondents, should the "odd lot" doctrine be applied.

of

At least

where the delay is responsibility of the applicant for benefits,
and

was

not

contributed

to

in

any

meaningful

way

by

the

Respondents, any shifting of the burden of proof would be grossly
prejudicial and unfair to Respondents.
-15-

C.

Mr. Jackson is not Entitled to Additional Compensation.
It is important

to note that the party challenging the

findings of the administrative agency has the burden to marshal all
of the evidence showing that, "despite the supporting facts, and in
light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings
are not supported by substantial evidence." Grace Drilling Co. v.
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989).

Where he

complains about conclusions drawn from hearing testimony, he must
also provide a transcript. King v. Industrial Commission, 209 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 34.

Here, Mr. Jackson has provided conclusory

arguments instead of marshalling the evidence and, while invoking
his own hearing testimony, did not provide a transcript.
Utah law also clearly places with the Applicant the burden of
establishing both legal causation and medical causation. Allen v.
Industrial

Commission,

729 P.2d

15

(Utah

1986).

Since the

Applicant has a preexisting condition, he has to prove an unusual
or extraordinary exertion to establish legal causation, and he must
demonstrate medically that the industrial injury resulted in the
disability of which he now complains.

Allen, 729 P.2d at 26, 27.

The ALJ found that the Applicant did not meet either prong of his
causation burden (Record, p. 43.)
6

Mr. Jackson also provided no argument or factual basis
for a modification of his prior permanent partial disability award
pursuant to the Commission's continuing jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-78. Nor did he demonstrate any significant change
or new development in the injury since the prior award that would
justify such action. See Buxton v. Industrial Commission, 587 P.2d
-16-

The Applicant argues that an ALJ must always resolve all
conflicts

in

favor

of

an Applicant,

and

suggests

that

the

Commission's rationale for denying benefits, "is nothing more than
a ruse to get out of paying benefits"
Applicant is wrong.
however

(Brief, p. 10).

The

In the first instance, not all questions,

farfetched, must be resolved

in favor of the claim.

Rather, that liberal policy applies only to questions of statutory
construction and to those rare situations where the evidence on
both sides is equally probative.
this

record

to

impugn

Moreover, there is no basis in

the motives

of the Commission.

The

Commission does not pay the benefits and has no motive to resort to
a "ruse" to avoid them.
The

Applicant's

circuitous.

argument

He argues

that

is

self-defeating

the ALJ

improperly

and

often

relied upon

Dr. Hess' pulmonary assessment because of the 20-year gap between
the injury and the evaluation

(Brief, pp. 8-9); elsewhere, he

argues the efficacy of Dr. Hess' 1992 orthopedic assessment (Brief,
p. 10). He argues that Dr. Lawson's 1980 assessment of pulmonary
problems

should

be discounted

(Brief, p. 16) but

he ignores

Dr. Lawson's 1974 pulmonary assessment (Record, p. 204). He freely
cites doctors' reports alluding to back problems (Brief, pp. 7, 1516) but he refuses to accept the weight accorded by the ALJ to the
(footnote continued)
121 (Utah 1978). Where there has been no development that would
justify modification of the prior award, there is no logical
justification for the Commission to entertain entry of a new one.
-17-

fact that Drs. Lawson and Lamb attributed the back complaints to
degenerative arthritis without mentioning an industrial cause
(Brief, pp. 7-8, 16).
Mr. Jackson argues that "the inability of an injured worker to
locate

and

obtain medical

records

over

20 years

old

should

certainly not be construed against an otherwise perfectly valid
claim

. . ." (Brief, pp. 9-10).

For the reasons noted above,

unless an applicant produces sufficient evidence to meet his burden
of proof, his is not a perfectly valid claim.

Mr. Jackson,

explained his delay in filing by stating he "just didn't get around
to it" (Record, p. 91).

In civil litigation, such delays will

completely bar a claim on the basis of laches and estoppel; even
under the comparatively relaxed procedural rules applicable to
workers1 compensation, the prejudice due to such delays must be
charged to the applicant and not the employer.
Mr. Jackson also attempts to dismiss the pulmonary findings
because he worked with his lung condition "for 34 years" (Brief,
p. 9).

That

argument

has

never

defeated

claims

of

total

disability, which can be masked by a motivated worker. See, Norton
v. Industrial Commission, 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986).

His attempt

also fails because there is persuasive evidence of total pulmonary
disability early in the record:
applied

the Applicant admits that he

for and has been receiving

federal black lung total

disability benefits since 1973. These Defendants would not suggest
that the Applicant perjured himself to the Department of Labor and
-18-

has since defrauded it by accepting those benefits on a monthly
basis.

Rather, it appears much more likely, as the ALJ implicitly

found, that his actions were well-motivated at that time based upon
his symptoms and the medical advice he had received.
Now, nearly 20 years later and in another benefit setting, his
memory is conveniently at odds with his prior conduct. In the most
recent medical report, Dr. Hess found that Mr. Jackson's most
obvious physical limitation was "marked shortness of breath."

In

that report, Dr. Hess noted the Mr. Jackson's complaint that he
could not even walk one-quarter of a block and Dr. Hess termed his
shortness of breath the "prime problem" (Record, pp. 180, 185).
These are precisely the kinds of conflicts Administrative Law
Judges are supposed to weigh and resolve. The Judge appropriately
found that his testimony was "not credible" when viewed in light of
the applications for black lung disability and Social Security
benefits filed after he stopped working.

This, coupled with

several other "inconsistencies" in his testimony, undermined his
claim (Record, pp. 43-44).
Thus, nothing in the record requires a finding that the 1972
industrial injury caused or in any significant way contributed to
a condition of permanent total disability.

As this Court has

noted,

a

"if

a

claimant

cannot

demonstrate

connection, compensation should be denied."
Review, 812 P.2d at 450 (citations omitted).
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medical

causal

Merriam v. Board of

CONCLUSION
The orders of the ALJ and the Commission applied proper legal
standards and their findings are amply supported by the medical
evidence in the record.

That evidence demonstrates Mr. Jackson

sustained an industrial accident in 1972 for which he was fully
compensated. Separately, his pulmonary condition, perhaps combined
with his remaining back problem, gave rise to a totally disabling
condition for which he contemporaneously applied and then received
two separate awards of total disability benefits.

All of his

impairments have thus been compensated and his wage loss has been
more than replaced.
The Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review should be
affirmed by this Court.
DATED this 21st day of April, 1993.
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW, P.C.

Edwin C. Barnes, Esq.
Attorney for Kaiser Steel Corporation
and the Uninsured Employers' Fund
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